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Modelling efforts in opinion dynamics have to a large extent ignored that opinion exchange be-
tween individuals can also have an effect on how willing they are to express their opinion publicly.
Here, we introduce a model of public opinion expression. Two groups of agents with different opin-
ion on an issue interact with each other, changing the willingness to express their opinion according
to whether they perceive themselves as part of the majority or minority opinion. We formulate
the model as a multi-group majority game and investigate the Nash equilibria. We also provide
a dynamical systems perspective: Using the reinforcement learning algorithm of Q-learning, we
reduce the N -agent system in a mean-field approach to two dimensions which represent the two
opinion groups. This two-dimensional system is analyzed in a comprehensive bifurcation analysis
of its parameters. The model identifies social-structural conditions for public opinion predominance
of different groups. Among other findings, we show under which circumstances a minority can
dominate public discourse.
“The actual strength of [...] different
camps of opinion does not necessarily de-
termine which view will predominate in
public. An opinion can dominate in pub-
lic and give rise to the pressure of isola-
tion even if the majority of the popu-
lation holds the opposing view that has
come under pressure—yet does not pub-
licly admit to holding this position.”[1]
I. INTRODUCTION
Fundamental to models of opinion dynamics is the
assumption that people’s opinions are, in some way
or another, influenced by the opinion of their peers.
There is an extensive amount of models of opin-
ion change in social systems (see [2–4] for reviews).
While it is a plausible assumption that people who
express their opinion about an issue are sensitive to
approval and disapproval, feedback on the opinion
need not necessarily lead to its reconsideration. It
might also affect one’s willingness of opinion expres-
sion: The more positive (negative) the feedback, the
more (less) motivated one feels to publicly express
one’s opinion.
In comparison, this approach to public discourse
has remained, from a modelling perspective, rather
unexplored. However, it is worth to be considered:
In general, people are not always willing to reveal
their opinion on certain issues to others [5]. A re-
cent study shows that only a minority of users who
consume news online is also involved in sharing and
discussing them [6]. Thorough research on opinion
dynamics must take into account that some indi-
viduals might choose to not express their opinion
publicly, which has profound effect on how others
perceive the opinion climate in a social system. We
will hence, in this paper, focus on a model of the
expression of, and not the change in, opinions.
An theory of public opinion expression has already
been developed around fifty years ago, with Elisa-
beth Noelle-Neumann’s influential ‘spiral of silence’
[1, 7]. Roughly speaking, Noelle-Neumann sees the
fear of isolation as an essential drive for how hu-
mans publicly behave. Especially with respect to
morally charged topics, individuals constantly and
mostly sub-consciously monitor the ‘opinion land-
scape’ around them (they possess a “quasi-statistical
sense” [1, 7]) and might refrain from expressing their
opinion if they believe to be part of the minority. On
the other hand, a belief to hold the majority posi-
tion might encourage them to express their view.
Since each individual’s decision whether to express
her opinion or not influences how others perceive
the opinion landscape, whose evaluation might then
change accordingly, a dynamical development (for
which Noelle-Neumann used the metaphor of a spi-
ral) follows in which the seemingly dominant opin-
ion fraction becomes more and more vocal and the
perceived minority fraction becomes more and more
silent. Noelle-Neumann’s spiral of silence is particu-
larly interesting for mathematical modelling since it
links a micro mechanism with a dynamical develop-
ment at the macro level.
While there have been attempts to model opinion
expression and specifically the spiral of silence, they
are either in large parts simulative [8–12] or directed
towards the effect of specific circumstances on the
spiral of silence (mass media [13], social bots [9], or
the long-time effect of charismatic agents [12]). Gra-
novetter and Soong [14], and subsequently Krassa
[15], employ a threshold model of opinion expres-
sion which only applies to cases in which a certain
opinion is already suppressed. We aim here towards
a more general, structural understanding of the dy-
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2namics of opinion expression.
We develop a model which employs an account of
social influence termed social feedback theory [16].
The behavioral adjustment of agents depends solely
on the social feedback they receive when they ex-
press their opinion. This affective experience-based
interaction mechanism has already been shown to
lead to opinion polarization in connected networks
of sufficiently high modularity [17]. In the present
approach, the effect of social interaction is directed
towards the willingness of or incentive for individ-
uals to publicly express their opinion. We investi-
gate the structural conditions that promote or hin-
der opinion expression of different opinion groups.
This is firstly done from a game-theoretic angle. To
address questions of bounded rationality and equi-
librium selection, we also develop a dynamical sys-
tems perspective, using reinforcement learning in the
form of Q-learning [18]. This allows us to perform a
a mean-field approximation for the expected reward
of the two opinion groups, which reduces the system
to two dimensions.
In the following, we will first describe the base-
line social structure and the two central structural
parameters of the model. In section III, we repre-
sent the model as a multi-group majority game on
the agent network, and investigate its Nash equilib-
ria with respect to the structural parameters. Sec-
tion IV introduces Q-learning and a subsequent two-
dimensional approximation of the dynamical system.
In section V we perform a bifurcation analysis for the
different parameters involved. We conclude with a
discussion of the results and an outlook in section
VI.
II. SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL SETTING
For simplicity, we assume that there are two
groups of individuals holding two different opinions
on an issue. The opinion of an agent i, oi, is re-
ferred to by either 1 or 2, depending on the group
she belongs to. G1 is the group of agents holding
opinion 1, G2 the one holding opinion 2. According
to their opinion, the connections between agents are
described by weighted blocks (the entries q11, q12, q21
and q22 in the different blocks represent the weight
of every connection within that block) according to
the adjacency matrix A,
A =
 q12
q12q11
q22

. (1)
Opinion group G1 has size N1 and opinion group G2
has size N2. The weight of an edge between any two
agents of community 1 is q11, and analogously q22 for
the second community. Cross-edge weights are given
by q12 and q21. All weights q11, q22, q12, q21 ∈ [0, 1].
We assume an undirected network, hence
q12 = q21.
The weights of the edges can be interpreted as the
intensity or strength of the connections: The smaller
the weight, the less strong agents notice the presence
of each other. We can express the fraction of others
an agent perceives to hold the same opinion by
f11 =
(N1 − 1)q11
(N1 − 1)q11 +N2q12 (2)
for agents belonging to opinion group G1 and
f22 =
(N2 − 1)q22
(N2 − 1)q22 +N1q12 , (3)
for agents that are part of opinion group G2. The
perceived fractions of others belonging to the other
opinion group are consequently
f12 =
N2q12
(N1 − 1)q11 +N2q12 (4)
and
f21 =
N1q12
(N2 − 1)q22 +N1q12 . (5)
We now introduce the two central structural param-
eters, γ and δ. They are the ratios of the weighted
in-group to the out-group connections for each opin-
ion group and given by
γ =
N1 − 1
N2
· q11
q12
(6)
and
δ =
N2 − 1
N1︸ ︷︷ ︸
group sizes
· q22
q12
,︸ ︷︷ ︸
weights
(7)
3γ > 1 or δ > 1 means that the agents of one opinion
group are more strongly connected (under consid-
eration of both the group sizes and the weights) to
agents of the same than of the other opinion, while
γ < 1 or δ < 1 indicates that agents of the opinion
group are more strongly connected to agents hold-
ing a different opinion. In the following, if we say
that an opinion group is internally well-connected,
we mean that the structural parameter of the group
is bigger than 1. With γ and δ, the above fractions
(2), (3), (4) and (5) can be simplified to
f11 =
γ
γ + 1
, f12 =
1
γ + 1
, (8)
f22 =
δ
δ + 1
, f21 =
1
δ + 1
. (9)
Alternatively, we can interpret the fractions f11, f22,
f12 and f21 as the probabilities of interaction be-
tween agents of the different groups.1 This interpre-
tation will be made use of in section IV.
III. A SILENCE GAME
We now use the social structure described in sec-
tion II as the setting of a ‘silence game’. The opin-
ions of the agents are fixed according to their group
affiliation and do not change. Each agent can choose
one of two actions: Public expression of opinion, or
silence. Their preference over the actions depends
on the perception of their opinion environment. If
it appears to them that they are part of a minority
opinion, they become silent. If they think that they
are part of the majority, they express their opin-
ion.2 But only the expressive agents shape the sub-
jective impression of the opinion landscape of each
individual. Silent ones do not contribute (they are
not counted in the inequalities below). After all,
silence means that the individual’s opinion is not
public.
Moreover, we introduce as an additional model as-
sumption that opinion expression does not come for
free. It is costly to express one’s opinion,3 which is
accounted for by a constant cost c. This constant
1 In this case, A is interpreted as a stochastic block matrix
and the weights q11, q22 and q12 as probabilities of there
being an edge between any two agents, depending on their
group affiliation.
2 Games with fixed, different group affiliations of agents are
considered e.g. in [19] or [20].
3 We may think of the effort of typing a reply to someone in
social media, or the effort of joining a demonstration for or
against some issue.
might make more than a simple (perceived) opin-
ion majority necessary for an agent to also have an
incentive to express her opinion.
The ordinal preferences of an individual i over the
actions e (for opinion expression) and s (for silence)
are given as follows: The payoff or utility for opinion
expression, Ui(e, a−i) (given the actions of all others
a−i), is bigger than the one for silence,
Ui(e, a−i) > Ui(s, a−i),
if more agents in the perceived social environment
of i speak out who share i’s opinion. We can make
this condition explicit by the inequality∑
j∈G1
j 6=i
q11aj
(N1 − 1)q11 +N2q12 >
∑
j∈G2 q12aj
(N1 − 1)q11 +N2q12 + c
(10)
if i is part of opinion group G1 and∑
j∈G2
j 6=i
q22aj
(N2 − 1)q22 +N1q12 >
∑
j∈G1 q12aj
(N2 − 1)q22 +N1q12 + c
(11)
for i being part of G2. Both the right- and the left-
hand side are normalized with respect to the overall
weighted connections of agent i. Here, the actions
aj are given by aj = 1 for expression and aj = 0 for
silence. If the two sides (10) or (11) are equal, the
individual is indifferent in her preference over the
actions.
A strategy profile is called a Nash equilibrium
(NE) if no individual i can increase her expected re-
ward by unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium.
In our system, the equilibrium condition is met if
there is a strategy profile for which each individual
that expresses herself has (10) or (11) (depending
on the opinion group of the agent) satisfied, and if
for each individual that is silent, the corresponding
inequality is not fulfilled.
It is already visible in (10) and (11) that apart
from the fact that an individual does account for her
own expressed opinion in the inequality (i 6= j in the
sum on the left-hand side), the rest of the contribu-
tions in the inequalities are the same for all agents
of one opinion group. It is also visible that if (10) or
(11) is satisfied for an agent i that expresses herself,
it must be satisfied for all silent individuals of her
group as well: They ‘see’ one more agent expressing
their opinion than i, since i does not account for her-
self in her evaluation of her environment. Hence, we
have an additional positive term on their left-hand
side. On the other hand, if the inequality is not ful-
filled for a silent agent of one group, it can also not
be fulfilled for an expressive one. Therefore, in a
pure-strategy equilibrium, all agents of one opinion
group must choose the same action.
4This simplifies the inequalities above. If all agents
of an opinion group act the same, (10) and (11) can
be expressed in terms of the structural parameters
γ and δ. Four pure-strategy NEs might be possible,
depending on γ and δ. Both groups can be silent, or
only one of them, but not the other, or none:
• If both groups express their opinion (we call
this state (e, e); the first entry stands for the
collective action of G1, the second for the ac-
tion of G2), the following conditions must be
satisfied to make this state a NE:
(N1 − 1)q11 −N2q12
(N1 − 1)q11 +N2q12 − c =
γ − 1
γ + 1
− c > 0, (12)
4
(N2 − 1)q22 −N1q12
(N2 − 1)q22 +N1q12 − c =
δ − 1
δ + 1
− c > 0. (13)
• (e, s) is a NE if
(N1 − 1)q11
(N1 − 1)q11 +N2q12 − c =
γ
γ + 1
− c > 0, (14)
− N1q12
(N2 − 1)q22 +N1q12 − c = −
1
δ + 1
− c < 0. (15)
• (s, e) is a NE if
− N2q12
(N1 − 1)q11 +N2q12 − c = −
1
γ + 1
− c < 0, (16)
(N2 − 1)q22
(N2 − 1)q22 +N1q12 − c =
δ
δ + 1
− c > 0. (17)
• (s, s) is a NE if
− c < 0. (18)
The different existence regimes of the pure-
strategy NEs are given in Figure 1. If γ and δ
are both smaller than c1−c , then even if all group
members express their opinion and the other opin-
ion group is silent, it is too costly (compared to the
amount of connections to agents of the own opin-
ion group) to express one’s opinion and the only NE
is the one in which all individuals are silent. If γ
or δ or both are bigger than c1−c , but smaller than
c+1
1−c , either both opinion groups are silent or one of
the groups expresses themselves, but not both: The
4 We use equation (6) in the equivalence.
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FIG. 1. The available pure-strategy Nash equilibria in
different regimes of γ and δ. The equilibria are abbrevi-
ated by either e for expression or s for silence for each
opinion group (the first entry is for the collective action
of G1, the second for the one of G2). For costs c > 0,
γ and δ below c
1−c will lead to a situation in which the
only available Nash equilibrium is one in which no one
expresses her opinion publicly. An increase in the struc-
tural parameters above this threshold leads to additional
Nash equilibria in which at least one of the two opinion
groups speaks out. If both γ and δ are bigger than c+1
1−c ,
an additional Nash equilibrium arises in which all agents
express their opinion.
strength of internal connections of each group are
not sufficient to account for the negative influence of
the other, expressive group. Not both (12) and (13)
can be satisfied. Hence, this structural regime only
allows public opinion predominance of one group (or
complete silence).5 If γ and δ are both bigger than
c+1
1−c , it is possible that both opinion groups express
their opinon publicly at the same time. Then, the
positive influence of the in-group members still dom-
inates, even if all out-group members are expressive
as well. Hence, also (12) and (13) are satisfied.
Obviously, there are also mixed-strategy NEs.
Suppose the situation is as follows: The agents of
each group mix their actions uniformly such that
each agent is exactly indifferent between expressing
herself or staying silent. Then, no one has an incen-
tive for action change, and we therefore have a NE.
This equilibrium is, nevertheless, only metastable in
5 If either only the conditions for (e, s) or only for (s, e) are
satisfied, it is clear which opinion will dominate publicly
(if any). If both are satisfied, the situation becomes more
interesting in the sense that it depends on the initial condi-
tions and the dynamical development of the system which
opinion will predominate. We will approach these issues in
sections IV and V.
5the sense that it only takes one agent to increase
(or decrease) her expression probability in order to
make it favourable for all other agents of one opinion
group to express themselves (or become silent).
γ and δ do not only depend on the number of
agents holding one or another opinion. They are
also influenced by the internal connection weights
of agents of one opinion group. Hence, a well-
connected minority group can dominate public dis-
course if the corresponding structural parameter is
above the threshold of c1−c . But while the regimes of
different NEs in Figure 1 are displayed correctly, it
might give the impression that γ or δ are parameters
that can be tuned by simply increasing the weight of
a connection between two agents of the same group,
that is, q11 or q22 (all other parameters fixed). That
is not the case. Some numerical minorities cannot be
balanced by increasing internal connections since q11
and q22 are bounded by 1. If there are too few agents
in one opinion group, even setting q11 or q22 to 1 will
not be elevate γ or δ above a certain threshold. This
is made visible in Figure 2. The figure shows the
different existence regimes of the NEs for different
combinations of internal connection weights q11 and
q22 and partitions of a total of N = 100 agents be-
tween groups G1 and G2. q12 and c are fixed. Each
point in the plot stands for a combination of the
number of agents in opinion group G1, N1, and the
in-group connection weights q11, out of which one
can compute the value of γ. The lines of constant
γ are plotted in red. Since the overall number of
agents N = 100 is fixed, N2 is not independent and
determined by the choice of N1 by N − N1. If we
just assume that q22 = q11, each point in the plot
at the same time represents also a combination of
the relevant parameters of opinion group G2 out of
which one can compute δ. Curves of constant δ are
the blue lines and symmetrical to the γ-curves with
respect to N1 = 50.
A vertical line in the plot, e.g. at N1 = 20, can
be interpreted as follows: Each constant γ or δ value
that it intersects on its way to q11 = q22 = 1 is reach-
able for this partition of agents in the two groups if
q11 and q22 are tuned accordingly. But if there is
no intersection for a specific γ or δ, then even if
the internal connection weights are maximized, the
structural strength of the respective group cannot
reach that value due to their limited group size. For
N1 = 20, a state in which both opinion groups are
expressing themselves (the upper right, green area in
Figure 1) cannot be reached since opinion group G1
has too few agents to produce a γ high enough to sat-
isfy (12). In general, there are numerical thresholds
(dependent on the costs c, the cross-group connec-
tion weight q12 and the overall number of agents N)
below which reaching a state in which both group
0 20 40 60 80 100
N1
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
q 1
1 (
bl
ue
), 
q 2
2 (
re
d)
= 8= 4= 2= 1= 0.1
= 1 + c1 c = 1.5=
c
1 c = 0.25
= 0.25
= 1.5
N1 + N2 = 100, q12 = 0.2, c = 0.2
FIG. 2. The constant γ- and δ-curves for N = 100
agents. They are plotted with respect to N1, N2 =
N − N1, and q11 = q22. Each blue curve stands for
a combination of the number of opinion group members
N1 and internal connection weights q11 that yields a con-
stant value of the structural parameters γ, each red one
for a combination of N2 and q22 that produces constant
δ. The color-coding for the different Nash equilibrium
regions is analogous to Figure 1. It is visible that the
numerical minority of an opinion group cannot always
be compensated by increasing q11 (or q22), the weight
of a connection between two agents of the same opinion
group. Moreover, the fixed γ- and δ-curves are symmet-
ric with respect to N1 = N2 = 50, where they intersect.
(For better readability, the dashed δ-curves have not
been labelled. They correspond to their γ-counterparts.)
express themselves or in which the own group be-
comes dominant becomes impossible from a game-
theoretic perspective. The game-theoretic approach
hence can give (all other parameters fixed) limits for
the effect of group-internal coordination in the form
of internal cohesion on public discourse.
IV. Q-LEARNING AND A DYNAMICAL
SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE
While we are able to determine the Nash equilibria
of the system, the game-theoretical point of view
does not answer questions of equilibrium selection
or the effects of bounded rationality. In this section,
we will introduce a dynamical systems perspective
to approach those questions.
We posit a simple interaction mechanism between
the agents on the network of section II. It is given
as follows: If an agent expresses her opinion, she
will be paired with a random neighbor. Now, the
fractions f11, f12, f21, and f22 correspond to the
probability of meeting a neighbor of a certain opinion
6group given the own opinion group of an agent. The
neighbor then gives (if she also is in an expressive
state) social feedback to the agent, either agreement
or disagreement, which will contribute to the agent’s
impression of her opinion environment. Put in an
algorithmic way:
1. A random agent is selected.
2. If willing to speak out, the agent expresses her
opinion to a random neighbor at cost c.
3. If the neighbor is also willing to speak out, she
gives feedback on the agent’s opinion.
4. According to the feedback, the agent will be-
come more/less willing to speak out.
As in [17], we will describe the development of the
system as reinforcement learning dynamics, more
specifically, as dynamics induced by Q-learning. In
Q-learning, the reinforcement mechanism that up-
dates the agent’s willingness to express her opinion
is given by
Qt+1i = (1− α)Qti + αrti , (19)
where rti is the reward for agent i at time step t upon
expression
rti =
 −c for random neighbor being silent,−1− c for disagreeing random neighbor,1− c for agreeing random neighbor.
(20)
The Q-function is expected to converge to the re-
ward over time.6 The probability of expression is a
function of the value of Qi. We assume here a Boltz-
mann action selection mechanism, i.e. the probabil-
ity of expression of agent i is given by
pti =
1
1 + e−βQti
, (21)
the probability of staying silent by 1− pti. If β = 0,
the action choice of the agent is completely indepen-
dent of the Q-values and randomized. For increasing
β, the agent becomes more sensitive in her action
selection towards her current evaluation of her local
opinion environment. Then, a positive Q-value indi-
cates that it is more likely for her to express herself
than not, while a negative one indicates the opposite.
If β → ∞, the probabilities of the actions become
deterministic.
6 (19) describes Q learning for myopic agents, i.e. with dis-
count factor 0.
The expected reward for agent i upon opinion ex-
pression is given by either (if i belongs to opinion
group G1)
Ep[rti ] =−c+ f11
1
N1 − 1
∑
j∈G1
j 6=i
1
1 + e−βQ
t
j
−
f12
1
N2
∑
j∈G2
1
1 + e−βQ
t
j
, (22)
or (if i belongs to opinion group G2)
Ep[rti ] =−c+ f22
1
N2 − 1
∑
j∈G2
j 6=i
1
1 + e−βQ
t
j
−
f21
1
N1
∑
j∈G1
1
1 + e−βQ
t
j
. (23)
We follow [18], where Q-learning in two-player
two-action games is investigated, and take the
continuous-time limit of the Q-learning equation
(19). We divide time there into intervals δt. We
replace t+1 with t+ δt and α with α′δt. This yields
Qi(t+ δt)−Qi(t) = α′δt(ri(t)−Qi(t))
and hence
Q˙i = α
′(ri(t)−Qi(t)). (24)
Over time, the difference of the largest and the low-
est Q-value of an opinion group decays at least ex-
ponentially in expectation (see the Appendix for the
estimation):
d
dt
(Qmaxi∈G1 −Qmini∈G1) ≤ −α′(Qmaxi∈G1 −Qmini∈G1),
d
dt
(Qmaxi∈G2 −Qmini∈G2) ≤ −α′(Qmaxi∈G2 −Qmini∈G2).
That is, the Q-values of the agents of one group
are expected to converge over time. This allows us to
employ a mean-field approximation for the expected
reward of the two opinion groups: We introduce the
average Q-values for each opinion group7
Q1(t) =
1
N1
∑
i∈G1
Qi(t), Q2(t) =
1
N2
∑
i∈G1
Qi(t).
(25)
7 Note the slight abuse of notation here: From now on, the
index of Q and p will not indicate single individuals any
more, but the average Q-value and the corresponding ex-
pression probability of the different opinion groups.
7This means that we do not distinguish any more
between the agents of the respective opinion groups.
We assign them the average of their group’s Q-value.
This simplification will have an effect on the proba-
bility of opinion expression for the individuals. In-
stead of averaging over each groups probability of
expression, we simply insert the averaged Q-values
into the equation:
1
N1
∑
j∈G1
1
1 + e−βQj(t)
−→ 1
1 + e−βQ1(t)
= p1(t),
(26)
1
N2
∑
j∈G2
1
1 + e−βQj(t)
−→ 1
1 + e−βQ2(t)
= p2(t).
(27)
The expected reward for the different opinion
groups are given by the equations8
Ep[r1(t)] = −c+ γ
γ + 1
p1(t)− 1
γ + 1
p2(t), (28)
Ep[r2(t)] = −c+ δ
δ + 1
p2(t)− 1
δ + 1
p1(t), (29)
where the probabilities of expression for each group
are p1(t) and p2(t), and it is not distinguished any
more between the individuals.
We can therefore write our two-dimensional for-
mulation as follows:
Q˙1(t) = α
′(−c+ γ
γ + 1
p1(t)− 1
γ + 1
p2(t)−Q1(t)),
(30)
Q˙2(t) = α
′(−c+ δ
δ + 1
p2(t)− 1
δ + 1
p1(t)−Q2(t)).
(31)
According to equations (30) and (31), we can pro-
duce a phase portrait of the system including its tra-
jectories and fixed points for given exploration rate
β, structural parameters γ and δ, and costs of ex-
pression c. An example of how the phase portraits
change with γ and δ is given in Figure 3.
There, it is visible that the stable fixed points
of the system include basins of attraction, that is,
regimes of values of Q1 and Q2 for which the sys-
tem is expected to end up in those fixed points. The
basins of attraction in the two-dimensional approxi-
mation correspond exactly to those of the stochastic
N -agent system in the limit α → 0. For larger α,
both fixed points and basins of attraction do not nec-
essarily correspond to the two-dimensional approxi-
mation. We show averages over simulation runs for
different values of α in Figure 4.
8 f11, f12, f21, and f22 have been replaced according to equa-
tions (8) and (9) with γ
γ+1
, 1
γ+1
, δ
δ+1
, and 1
δ+1
.
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FIG. 3. Three phase portraits of theQ1- (x-axis) andQ2-
values (y-axis) of the two-dimensional system for differ-
ent configurations of γ and δ. We have c = 0.1, β = 10,
and structural parameters γ = δ = 0.1 (bottom left),
γ = δ = 1 (bottom right), and γ = δ = 3 (top right).
The yellow and blue lines in the phase portraits are the
isoclines of the equations forQ1 andQ2. The fixed points
are located at their intersections.
V. BIFURCATION AND STABILITY
ANALYSIS
In order to find the fixed points of Q1 and Q2, we
set (30) and (31) to 0, solve (30) for Q2 and insert
it into (31), which yields:
Q2 = − 1
β
ln (
1
γ
1+e−βQ1 − (γ + 1)(Q1 + c)
− 1) (32)
δ
δ + 1
(
γ
1 + e−βQ1
− (γ + 1)(Q1 + c))− 1
δ + 1
1
1 + e−βQ1
+
1
β
ln (
1
γ
1+e−βQ1 − (γ + 1)(Q1 + c)
− 1)− c = 0 (33)
Equation (33) now gives us the Q1-value of the
fixed points of the system, with which we can cal-
culate the corresponding Q2-value by equation (32).
In essence, the fixed points depend on four parame-
ters: β, γ, δ, and c. We will carry out a bifurcation
analysis of these parameters in the following.
After having solved equations (33) and (32) for Q1
and Q2, we can assess the stability of the respective
fixed points by calculating the eigenvalues of their
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FIG. 4. The trajectories of the Q-values in simulations,
averaged over 50 runs with N · 105 steps, for different
values of α with a starting point close to the border (red
line) of the two basins of attraction of the two stable
fixed points. The starting Q-values were Qi∈G1 = 0,
Qi∈G2 = −0.25. There were N = 200 agents, 100 of
each opinion group, and c = 0.1, q11 = 0.04, q12 = 0.05,
and q22 = 0.15. A relatively big α = 0.1 makes the
trajectory leave the lower right basin of attraction of the
two-dimensional system (black trajectory). Due to the
high α, the fixed point of the other basin of attraction is
also missed by some margin. The lower α, the closer the
trajectories get to the fixed point and the more probable
it is that they will stay in the basin predicted by the two-
dimensional approximation. For α = 0.01 (turquoise)
and α = 0.001 (light green), the trajectories run towards
the predicted fixed point. The yellow and blue lines are
the isoclines of the equations for Q1 and Q2. The fixed
points are located at their intersections.
Jacobian; two negative (real parts of the) eigenval-
ues indicate a stable attractor. In the following, we
analyze the bifurcation structure of the system de-
pending on the different types of parameters in the
system.
A. Structural power
The parameter γ describes the ratio of internal
versus external connectedness of G1. γ > 1 means
that on average each member of G1 is connected to
more agents of the own than of the other opinion
group. (Everything stated in this paragraph applies
equivalently to δ, which is just the parameter for the
ratio of internal versus external connectedness of the
other group.)
As is visible in Figure 5, for small γ (< 0.5), given
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FIG. 5. The development of the Q1- (top) and Q2-value
(bottom) of the fixed points with γ given β, relatively
high δ, and c. The colors of the curves in the two plots
indicate the different fixed point pairs of Q1 and Q2. A
dashed line indicates an unstable fixed point, a contin-
uous one a stable fixed point. It is visible in the plots
that a poorly connected opinion group G1 (γ < 0.5) will
be driven into silence by the other group (beige curve).
With increasing in-group connectivity, fixed points arise
for which G1 expresses their opinion in two saddle-node
bifurcations (red for an an (e, s)-equilibrium and blue
for (e, e)). For γ > 4.5, G1 is so well-connected that the
equilibrium disappears in which the group is silent.
β = 10, δ = 2.36 (that is, a quite well-connected
opposite opinion group) and c = 0.1, there is only
one (stable) fixed point with negative Q1-value and
positive Q2. While γ grows, a saddle-node bifurca-
tion occurs such that one stable and one unstable
fixed point appear for positive Q1 and negative Q2.
Another saddle-node bifurcation occurs at around
γ = 2; and for γ > 4.2, the low-Q1 fixed points
disappear in another saddle-node.
9How can this be interpreted? In essence, an opin-
ion community that is not well-connected internally
(γ < 0.5) will be driven into silence (a Q-value much
lower than 0) by the opposite opinion group that is
internally more cohesive. With increasing γ, that is,
increasing internal connectedness, other fixed points
appear in which the former group is expressive. To
be precise, the Q-values here are only indicative of
probabilities of opinion expression according to the
Boltzmann action selection which depends on Q. If
Q is smaller than 0, the probability of expression
is smaller than the probability of staying silent. In
the following, if we say that one opinion group is ex-
pressive, we mean that they have a Q-value bigger
than 0 which makes their probability of expression
higher than that of silence. With a further increase
of γ, the stable fixed point for which only the oppo-
site opinion group is expressive disappears and we
remain with three fixed points (the middle one un-
stable), for which either the first opinion group is
‘loud’ alone or both groups express their opinions.
Hence, G1 is now too cohesive to be driven into si-
lence by the other group. Increased internal cohesion
of one opinion group can hence have the effect that
this group, which is not necessarily a majority, will
dominate public discourse.
A lower δ-value (e.g. δ = 1.6) leads to a reduc-
tion in available fixed points (Figure 6) such that
only two saddle-node bifurcations occur and at high
γ only one fixed point remains in which the first
opinion group is expressive.
B. Costs
The costs for opinion expression have a profound
impact on the fixed points of the system. If opinion
expression is very ‘expensive,’ (in Figure 7: c > 0.4),
there is only one fixed point in the system for which
both opinion groups stay silent. For decreasing
costs, two pairs of fixed points arise in a saddle-node
bifurcation. Each of the pairs corresponds to a situ-
ation in which one opinion group is expressive, while
the other is silent (in Figure 7, we have identical val-
ues for γ and δ). The fixed point in which both opin-
ion groups are silent becomes unstable with decreas-
ing c in a pitchfork bifurcation. Below c = 0.1, an-
other pitchfork bifurcation arises for which the stable
fixed point now corresponds to a state in which both
groups are expressing their opinion. Costs can also
be negative: Then, the individuals might be intrin-
sically motivated or externally encouraged to speak
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FIG. 6. The development of Q1- and Q2-fixed points
with γ given β, moderate δ and c. For γ < 0.4, only
group G2 is expressive. A second fixed point arises for
higher γ in which G1 is predominating public discourse.
There is no fixed point in which both groups are expres-
sive.
out.9 For sufficiently negative costs (in the case of
Figure 7: c < −0.05), only one fixed point exists:
Everyone has an incentive to speak out, at least for
internally well-connected opinion groups. The fixed
points for which only one of the groups is expressive
disappear in two saddle-nodes.
9 Ideas such as e.g. free speech might have such an effect:
People then see it as their duty to voice their opinion, es-
pecially if it does not conform to the apparent majority.
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FIG. 7. The development of the fixed points with c given
β and γ = δ. The two are symmetric since c is the same
for both and has the same impact on both groups if they
also have identical structural parameters. If expression is
costly, everyone is silent, if it has negative costs, everyone
speaks out.
C. Asymmetric costs
The model allows us to also assign different costs
to each opinion group, such that c1 6= c2. Internal
motivation for a cause, for example, can be an in-
centive to speak out and might even be indicated
by negative costs (that is, an urge to express one’s
opinion). Moreover, there might be biases in the in-
frastructures on which debate takes place such that
it takes more effort for one group to speak out than
for the other.10
10 One may think here about online platforms whose design
favours engagement of certain demographic groups or states
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c1
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Q
1
= 10, = = 2.36, c2 = 0.1
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FIG. 8. Fixed-point development with c1 independent of
c2, given β = 10, γ = δ = 2.36, c2 = 0.1. Strongly nega-
tive c1 corresponds to a strong motivational disposition
(or many hard cores) in the opinion group to express
their opinion. There, only fixed points in which this
opinion group is expressive exist. For decreasing moti-
vation (fewer hard cores), fixed points arise in which the
second opinion group is the only expressive one.
The bifurcation in Figure 8 (for the case of two
internally well-connected opinion groups) illustrates
the effect that different expression costs in the pop-
ulations exhibit on public discourse. In Figure 8, a
bifurcation over c1 is shown. Negative costs for opin-
ion expression in opinion group G1 yield two stable
equilibria in which opinion group 1 is expressive, ei-
ther together with opinion group G2 or alone. With
increasing costs, a stable fixed point arises in a sad-
dle node for which G1 is silent (at c1 ≈ 0), while
that encourage or try to prevent certain opinion groups to
speak out.
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FIG. 9. The development of the fixed points with β given
c = 0.1 and γ = δ = 2.36. Since γ and δ are the same,
the plots are symmetric.
G2 is expressive. At c1 ≈ 0.15 and at c1 ≈ 0.4, the
two fixed points for which G1 expresses opinion dis-
appear. For costs that high, opinion group G1 will
not be publicly audible any more. Asymmetric costs
can hence drive certain opinion groups into silence.
D. Exploration rate
The parameter β determines how sensitive agents
are in their actions towards the current evaluation
of their expected reward. A high β-value indicates a
choice of the agent similar to a best response to their
current evaluation of the expected reward, while β =
0 means that each available action is chosen with
equal probability.
As is visible in Figure 9, for very low β, there
is only one fixed point available with a very low Q-
value for both opinion groups. With β (≈ 5), further
fixed points arise in a supercritical pitchfork bifurca-
tion, and then, at β > 6, another (now subcritical)
pitchfork bifurcation arises, such that we arrive at
three stable fixed points (one in which both groups
are in an expressive mode, and one for opinion dom-
inance for each group) and two unstable ones in-
between. Hence, if the action selections is close to
a best response, we get more possible equilibria in
the system. In the intermediate region, we have a
situation in which only one of the two groups can be
expressive, despite them both being internally well-
connected.
VI. DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK
a. The spiral of silence and beyond. The
present model provides a structural view on collec-
tive opinion expression. It reproduces the counterin-
tuitive result postulated by Noelle-Neumann in her
theory of the spiral of silence [1, 7], namely the pos-
sibility of the public dominance of a minority opin-
ion. While the influence of mass media has been
stressed in many publications concerning the spiral
of silence, we show that no mass media is needed for
this effect. Being an internally well-connected com-
munity alone can be enough to gain public opinion
predominance. This finding gains traction in light of
the advent of social media, which facilitated commu-
nication among like-minded people and decentral-
ized information distribution. Apart from that, the
present approach also provides conditions for the
‘overcoming’ of the spiral of silence (in the sense
that both groups express their opinion publicly), for
which the numerical proportions do not necessarily
have to change. The increase in internal cohesion of
the different opinion groups can be sufficient. On the
other hand, it is also shown that if the minority is
too small, even maximum internal cohesion cannot
heave the minority opinion into public predominance
(see again Figure 2).
b. Perception biases. In [8], the effect of the
ego-network size, that is, the (average) number con-
nections of the agents, on the occurrence of the spi-
ral of silence was investigated. It was concluded
that an increase in network density makes it more
probable that one opinion group does not speak out
publicly. In our work, we show that more density
might even have the opposite effect. It depends on
where the additional connections are made: If new
connections are guided by homophily, such that the
opinion blocks become more cohesive, the spiral of
silence might even be overcome (see path (i) in Fig-
ure 10). We then arrive at a structure similar to
‘echo chambers,’ in which only the voices affirm-
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FIG. 10. Illustration of the transitions between the
game-theoretic equilibrium regions for (i) stronger inter-
nal cohesion of both opinion groups (‘echo chambers’),
(ii) less internal cohesion of both (heterophilious connec-
tions), and (iii) stronger internal cohesion for only one
opinion group (’#metoo’).
ing one’s own view are heard and the others are
blocked out (see [21] for a contribution linking opin-
ion dynamics to the emergence of echo chambers).
If the additional connections are made between the
opinion blocks, both γ and δ decrease, which might
make it more probable that the individuals have a
more realistic picture of the overall opinion land-
scape. Then, the spiral effect is indeed more prob-
able. But if the cross-group connections grow even
further, both opinion groups misjudge their propor-
tion to their own disadvantage, such that no group
speaks out if there are costs associated to opinion
expression (path (ii) in Figure 10). The structure
of the social contacts alone is already sufficient to
cause misjudgements about opinion proportions in a
social system. This is closely linked to more general
accounts of perception biases [22].
c. Critical mass. Furthermore, the model links
to studies dealing with tipping points in social sys-
tems and the necessary numerical allocations, de-
pending on the network structures. This has e.g.
been analyzed for social conventions [23]. If the so-
cial network of individuals is structured in opinion
blocks, there is a hard numerical limit for the over-
coming of a state in which one opinion is dominating
publicly. For example, for a cross-opinion connec-
tion probability of 0.2 (as in Figure 2), the state in
which both opinion camps are expressive cannot be
reached if the minority makes up less than 22% of
the population.
d. Limits and outlook. While we have stressed
the generality of this work, we want to emphasize its
limits as well: The homogeneous network structure
of opinion blocks is not particularly realistic. Real
social networks are rather heterogeneous, with well-
connected and very active hubs and more ‘remote’
individuals. Nevertheless, weighted (or stochastic
[24]) blocks can serve as a baseline for mathematical
accessibility.
Moreover, this work is concerned with one way
of reacting on social feedback, namely, the change
in willingness to express one’s opinion. Change in
opinion is not included. It is probable that these
phenomena take place on different time scales. Also,
the social environments prompting opinion change
might be different from the ones in which opinion
predominance is fought for. In demonstrations, if
two opinion camps meet each other, the main ob-
jective might not be information exchange or the
need to convince each other, but to gain public au-
dibility. Hence, a combination of models of opinion
change and opinion expression might be in order in a
multi-layer network approach, in which opinion for-
mation and the competition for public opinion pre-
dominance take place on possibly different but in-
terdependent network structures.
While there are plenty of studies on experimental ev-
idence for the micromechanisms grounding the spiral
of silence (see [5] for a review), we are also seeking a
more systematic larger-scale view on collective phe-
nomena of opinion expression, which are closely re-
lated to the parameters γ and δ in the model. A
very prominent example of emerging collective opin-
ion expression online, for which this model provides
an explanation, is the Twitter-hashtag ‘#metoo’ and
the subsequent movement against sexual harassment
and sexual assault: Women found a device (in this
case, a hashtag) that allowed them to find and con-
nect to people who had experienced the same, and
also to people who supported them. And all of a
sudden, it was easier for them to speak out (path
(iii) in Figure 10). Measurements are an intricate
task here: The networks one constructs out of inter-
actions between individuals are only the networks of
interaction, that is, of only one part of the actions
one wants to observe. Silent individuals do usually
not show up in such networks since they are not in-
volved in an observable way.
In conclusion, we develop a model of opinion ex-
pression which allows the investigation of how social
structures can prevent or promote public opinion ex-
pression of different opinion groups. This approach
allows direct connection to an influential theory of
the social sciences, the spiral of silence [1, 7]. We
approach the model both from a game-theoretic and
from a dynamical systems perspective and show how
the public audibility of certain opinions depends on
the sensitivity of the agents towards their current
evaluation of expected reward, the structural cohe-
sion of the opinion groups and the costs for opinion
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Appendix A: Expected decrease of the
difference in Q-values
We carry out the estimation for opinion group
G1, but the analogue holds for opinion group G2.
We can give an upper bound for the change in Q-
value for the agent with the maximum Q-value of
the group, Q˙maxi∈G1 , and a lower bound for the change
in Q-value for the agent with the minimum Q-value
of the group, Q˙mini∈G1 due to the monotonicity of the
function 11+e−x :
Q˙maxi∈G1 =α
′(
γ
γ + 1
1
N1 − 1
∑
j∈G1
j 6=i
1
1 + e−βQj
− 1
γ + 1
1
N2
∑
j∈G2
1
1 + e−βQj
−Qmaxi∈G1 − c) ≤
α′(
γ
γ + 1
1
N1
(
∑
j∈G1
j 6=i
1
1 + e−βQj
+
1
1 + e−βQ
max
i∈G1
)− 1
γ + 1
1
N2
∑
j∈G2
1
1 + e−βQj
−Qmaxi∈G1 − c), (A1)
Q˙mini∈G1 =α
′(
γ
γ + 1
1
N1 − 1
∑
j∈G1
j 6=i
1
1 + e−βQj
− 1
γ + 1
1
N2
∑
j∈G2
1
1 + e−βQj
−Qmini∈G1 − c) ≥
α′(
γ
γ + 1
1
N1
(
∑
j∈G1
j 6=i
1
1 + e−βQj
+
1
1 + e−βQ
min
i∈G1
)− 1
γ + 1
1
N2
∑
j∈G2
1
1 + e−βQj
−Qmini∈G1 − c). (A2)
If we now look at the change in time in the dif-
ference of Qmaxi∈N1 and Q
min
i∈N1 , we can conclude by
the above inequalities that the difference decreases
at least exponentially in expectation by substracting
the right hand-sides of (A1) and (A2).
d
dt
(Qmaxi∈G1 −Qmini∈G1) ≤ −α′(Qmaxi∈G1 −Qmini∈G1).(A3)
The analogue holds for opinion group G2:
d
dt
(Qmaxi∈G2 −Qmini∈G2) ≤ −α′(Qmaxi∈G2 −Qmini∈G2).(A4)
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